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Identity-based encryption is an important cryptographic system that is employed to ensure conﬁdentiality of a message in
communication. This article presents a provably secure identity based encryption based on post quantum security assumption. The security of the proposed encryption is based on the hard problem, namely Learning with Errors on integer
lattices. This construction is anonymous and produces pseudo random ciphers. Both public-key size and ciphertext-size have
been reduced in the proposed encryption as compared to those for other relevant schemes without compromising the
security. Next, we incorporate the constructed identity based encryption (IBE) for Internet of Things (IoT) applications,
where the IoT smart devices send securely the sensing data to their nearby gateway nodes(s) with the help of IBE and the
gateway node(s) secure aggregate the data from the smart devices by decrypting the messages using the proposed IBE
decryption. Later, the gateway nodes will securely send the aggregated data to the cloud server(s) and the Big data analytics is
performed on the authenticated data using the Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) algorithms for accurate
and better predictions.

1. Introduction
According to [1], it is projected by 2027 the market of
Internet of Things (IoT) industry will grow by $2 trillion
annually, which has already a market of $520 billion in
2022. In the connected world, the IoT makes an environment where various smart devices are interconnected
with each other. The advancement of information and
communications technology (ICT) makes the IoT technologies and their solutions rich that have great impact to
the society for improving the human life advanced and

easy. There are enormous applications of IoT, such as
Industrial IoT (IIoT), smart cities, healthcare monitoring, smart home, and so on. In an IIoT, various IoT smart
devices are connected in an industry to collect
manufacturing data in order to predict the failure rates to
increase productivity and eﬃciency [2]. In healthcare
application, various smart devices like smartwatches and
medical sensors are connected in the body of a patient to
collect vital information and provide appropriate health
condition of that person. Furthermore, in recent days,
smart home application is in limelight where the smart
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devices like smart locks and home appliances are connected with each other via the internet and they can
be also controlled via the mobile devices. Though IoT
has transformed the human life easier, there are
various serious threats associated with IoT applications. For instance, it was found by HP that 70% of the
devices connected IoT devices are vulnerable to various
attacks [3].
In IoT applications, the smart devices exchange the
sensitive data among each other and also with various other
entities. In such a scenario, an unauthorized user or an
attacker may take the advantage to compromise the data by
eavesdropping, modifying, updating and deleting the information during the communication [4]. According to
broadcom [5] in the year 2017, it was found that there was an
approximately 600% hike in attacks against IoT devices in
various applications. Therefore, there is a great need to
design a secure IoT system to protect the data from the
attackers [6].
Once the sensing information from the deployed smart
devices in an IoT environment is aggregated by the nearby
gateway node or access point, the gathered data needs to be
also stored in semi-trusted cloud servers. Now, the stored
data at the cloud is huge in volume and it needs data analytics. As a result, it is preferable to used some Big data
analytics using traditional Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) algorithms for accurate and better
predictions [7, 8].
Ahanger et al. [9] provided various Machine Learning
(ML) and Deep Learning (DL) based mechanisms for IoT
paradigm. They also provided a taxonomy based on several
IoT vulnerabilities, respective attackers and eﬀects, as well
as various threats. Iwendi et al. [10] pointed out the important of deep learning (DL) for detecting attacks in IoT
paradigm. They suggested DL based mechanism to detect
cyber-attacks on IoT using a long short term networks
classiﬁer.
Omolara et al. [11] gave an IoT concept and then provided the deep insights into possible solutions to the IoT
security challenges due to the heterogeneous nature of IoT,
and the respective emerging issues, opportunities, gaps as
well as recommendations. Mukhopadhyay et al. [12] pointed
out that IoT sensors need to be reliable, safety as well as
privacy-aware for the users interacting with them. Thus, they
discussed that IoT sensors having advanced AI capabilities
will have the potential for identifying, detecting, and
avoiding performance degradation as well as discovering
new patterns.
Public-key cryptosystem works under a pair of keys
(public key and private key), whereas the public key is
made public that is accessible by everyone during communication, and the private key is kept secret and only
known to the owner (sender/signer). The notion of the
“Identity-Based Encryption (IBE)” due to Shamir [13],
solves the certiﬁcate management problem. The existing
Shor’s algorithm [14] is a big threat to the existing
number-theoretic identity-based encryptions. The main
diﬀerence of IBE from certiﬁcate based public-key encryption schemes lies in the way how the public and secret
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keys pair generated for a user. A private key generator, say
PKG handles the process of secret key generation, but it
executes user authentication process to conﬁrm the
validity of a legitimate user. In IBE process, a public key
may be an information such as the user’s email address or
mobile number. The corresponding secret key is generated by embedding the user’s identity with the PKG’s
master secret. This process removes the need of certiﬁcate
that is required for veriﬁcation of a legitimate recipient’s
public key. The IBE process also solves the problems
related to key generations and distributions in a multiuser settings. In case of limited resources, it can also oﬀer
the potential solution to make the process resource
eﬃcient.
In the literature, we have three important classes of
identity-based encryptions (IBE) (see in Figure 1): 1) IBE
based on bilinear pairings [15–18], 2) IBE based on quadratic
residue [19, 20], and 3) IBE based on lattices [21]. To the best
of our knowledge, most of the constructions proposed in the
standard model relies on bilinear pairings.
Chamola et al. [22] reviewed that the disruption which
the quantum computers have caused in the cryptographic
ﬁeld. They pointed out that the existing public key encryption schemes can be broken by the quantum computers,
and as a result, there is a requirement for hunting the new
cryptographic mechanisms that need to be secure in the
post-quantum era. Hassija et al. [23] provided a review on
several quantum computing applications that can be applied
in diﬀerent computer science areas, including “cryptography”, “machine learning”, “deep learning” as well as
“quantum simulations”. They also provided several real-life
case studies on “risk analysis”, “logistics”, and “satellite
communication”. Hassija et al. [24] also discussed that with
the help of online cloud services, the ﬁrst generation of
quantum computers can be programmed and accessed using
the available software development kits. Moreover, they
presented a growing trend in both the investments as well as
patents in the quantum computing ﬁeld. In recent years, the
lattice-based cryptography has played a very important role
in the post-quantum era for various real-life applications,
such as “Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET)” [25], “
medical Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)” [26] and “mobile
communications” [27].

1.1. Research Contributions. There are two reasons to move
towards post quantum secure lattice based cryptography: a)
simple algebraic operations that are based on matrix multiplication and b) secure against existing quantum assisted
algorithms. The main contributions of the work are listed
below:
• This article presents a new identity-based encryption
based on lattices without using the random oracles.
The proposed encryption is anonymous in nature [28],
which means that the cipher does not reveal the recipient’s identity.
• Our proposed encryption is selective-ID secure [29], and
can be converted to an adaptive-ID secure [15, 16, 30] by
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Figure 1: A communication model for IBE.

taking the bit-wise decomposition of the corresponding
identities.
• The proposed encryption is inspired from the Water’s
[18] encryption and signature that use only non-zero
positions of bits in the decomposition of the corresponding identity. The encryption is secure under
“learning with errors” assumption without the random
oracles.
• If κ is an appropriate security parameter and O(κ2 ) is
the size of a public key, we can relate the computation
time in terms of security parameter complexity as
O(κ2 ), and it can be compared with the size of classic
public key (such as RSA [31] and ElGamal [32]
cryptosystems) as O(κ) and computation time in
terms of security parameter as O(κ3 ), respectively [33].
• We then incorporate the constructed identity based
encryption (IBE) for IoT applications, where the smart
devices send securely the sensing data to their nearby
gateway nodes(s) with the help of IBE and the gateway
node(s) secure aggregate the data from the smart
devices by decrypting the messages using the proposed
IBE decryption. Later, the authenticated data stored at
the cloud server(s) will be used for accurate and better
predictions with the help of AI/ML algorithms.

encrypts a message using the identity. Finally, the Decrypts
algorithm decrypts a ciphertext with the help of the corresponding private key.

1.2. Paper Outline. In Section 2, the security of an IdentityBased Encryption (IBE) is discussed. Section 3 provides a
discussion of basic preliminaries that are needed to analyze
the proposed scheme in Section 4. In Section 5, we incorporating our proposed IBE scheme for IoT-enabled AI
applications. Next, the security analysis of the proposed
scheme under standard models is discussed in Section 6. A
comparative study among the proposed scheme and other
relevant schemes is given in Section 7. Some concluding
remarks are then provided in Section 8.

2.2. Security Model. We now deﬁne an IBE semantic security
under the IND-sID-CCA2 with the help of a game that is
played between a challenger, say C and an adversary A. The
description of the game is given below.

2. Security of an Identity-Based Encryption
An identity-based encryption (IBE) [15] comprises of four
phases (algorithms): a) Set-up, b) Extraction, c) Encrypts,
and d) Decrypts. The Set-up algorithm is run under the
public parameters and a secret master key. The Extraction
algorithm makes use of the master key to create a secret key
respective to the given identity. The Encrypts algorithm

2.1. Both Selective and Adaptive Encryption. The security
model of an IBE [15] deﬁnes the “indistinguishable adaptive
chosen cipher and chosen identity (IND-ID-CCA2)” security. It allows a probabilistic polynomial time-adversary,
say A to pick an identity on which it wants to target. A
weaker version of an IBE security [34] restricts the adversary
A to announce the target or identity at advance, that is
known as the “indistinguishable adaptive chosen cipher and
selective identity (IND-sID-CCA2)” security. We have
described this system as a selective identity and chosen
cipher secure identity-based encryption. In this version of
encryption, we will not allow the adversary A to process
decryption queries on the target identity, which implies a
weaker notion of the “indistinguishable against adaptive
chosen cipher and chosen identity (IND-ID-CCA2) and
indistinguishable adaptive chosen cipher and selective
identity (IND-sID-CCA2)”, respectively. Another important notion is the “indistinguishable cipher against chosen
plaintext attack (IND-CPA)”, which is also called semantic
security.

1. Target-phase: A declares the target identity ID∗ in
advance.
2. Set-up-phase: C executes the Set-up-phase, generates
the public parameters for A, and keeps the master key
as secret.
Phase-1. A submits queries q1 , q2 , . . ., qm corresponding to
the identities ID1 , ID2 , . . ., IDm , respectively, where
IDi ≠ ID∗ for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Now, C runs an algorithm, called
Extraction(Mk, IDi ) with the master key Mk and identity
IDi to obtain the private key Di corresponding to the identity
IDi , IDi , which is the public key. Then, it sends Di to A,
where all the queries are processed adaptively meaning that
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A can make queries with the knowledge of the previous
queries.
3. Challenge-phase: After completion of Phase-1, A
submits two messages m0 and m1 from the message
space on which it executes the challenge. The challenger C then picks b ∈ {0, 1} randomly, and outputs
c �Encrypts(paramts, ID∗ , mb ) and sends it to A,
where paramts, paramts are the parameters relevant
to encryption.

,

,
,

4. Guess-phase: Finally, A requires to guess a bit
b′ ∈ {0, 1}. The game is won by A if b′ � b; otherwise,
A looses the game.
We call such an adversary A as an IND-sID-CPA-adversary, and deﬁne the advantage of A attacking the
identity-based encryption, say P as



1
(1)
A DVA (P) � Prb � b′  − .
2
We can also describe an adaptive phase to the above
notion by excluding the target phase, and permitting A to
wait for the challenge phase to declare ID∗ as challenge
identity. A can submit the arbitrary key extraction queries as
in Phase-1, and then select an identity ID∗ , ID∗ as a target.
But, the only condition imposed here is that A cannot
submit extraction query on ID∗ , ID∗ in Phase-1, and the
resulting notion is called as IND-ID-CPA security. In Cipher-Anonymity along with semantic security, we have
another important notion of cipher anonymity under
chosen plaintext attack.

3. Preliminaries
Let R be a set of real numbers and x ∈ R be a real number.
We denote ⌊x⌋ as the largest integer, but not greater than x,
whereas ⌞x⌝ � ⌞x + 1/2⌝ denotes the integer closest to x,
with ties broken upward. We apply a bold big letter A to
denote a matrix and a bold small letter x to denote a column
vector of the matrix A, where [A|x] denotes concatenation of
the matrix A with a vector x. Let Z denote the set of all
integers and Zq � Z/qZ be a quotient ring under integers
modulo a prime q, that is, a collection of the (left or right)
cosets a + qZ with addition and multiplication operations in
the quotient ring Zq . It is worth noticing that y � z(modq) if
and only if y + qZ � z + qZ, which is an obvious fact about
the equality of cosets.
3.1. Lattice. A lattice Δ is deﬁned with the following two
properties: 1) it is an additive subgroup which implies 0 ∈ Δ,
and −x, x + y ∈ Δ for all x, y ∈ Δ, and 2) it is discrete that
implies every x ∈ Δ possesses a neighborhood in Rn in which
x is the only lattice point in the neighborhood. More speciﬁcally, the ith successive minima λi (Δ) is the smallest
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Phase-2. A submits the adaptive extraction queries qm+1 ,
qm+2 , . . ., qn corresponding to IDm+1 , IDm+2 , . . ., IDn , where
IDi ≠ ID∗ , respectively. Next, C replies as in Phase-1.
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Figure 2: A two-dimensional lattice with bad basis.

Euclidean norm ℓ such that Δ possesses i number of linearly
independent vectors of norm less than or equal to ℓ. Due to
properties of a discrete group, one can observe that the
quotient group Rn /Δ of cosets c + Δ � {c + v: v ∈ Δ}, c ∈ Rn ,
under the usual addition: (c1 + Δ) + (c2 + Δ) � (c1 + c2 ) + Δ
in the quotient group. A fundamental domain of Δ is a set
F ⊂ Rn that contains exactly one representative
c ∈ (c + Δ) ∩ F of each coset c + Δ.
3.2. Bases and Fundamental Parallelepiped. A lattice (see Fig.
2) is generated by a basis B � b1 , b2 , . . ., bm } and the integer
linear combination of the linearly independent vectors b1 , b2 ,
. . ., bm in the basis as Δ � Δ(B) � m
i�1 zi bi : zi ∈ Z. The
positive integer m is the rank of the basis and n represents
the dimension of the space under consideration. We can
consider m � n to represent a full rank lattice. A lattice
possesses inﬁnitely many bases, because if B is a basis then
BU is also a basis for a unimodular matrix. If B is a basis of
the lattice Δ, the fundamental domain is the parallelepiped
P(B) � B[−1/2, 1/2) centered at the origin. Note that parallelepiped is formed by “six parallelogram sides to result in a
three-dimensional ﬁgure” or a “Prism”, which contains a
parallelogram base.
Deﬁnition 1. Let b1 , b2 , . . ., bm ∈ Rn be linearly independent
tuples, a lattice Δ generated by a basis B � b1 , b2 , . . ., bm } is
denoted Δ(b1 , b2 , . . ., bm ) � Σi zi bi :zi ∈ Z}. The integers m
and n denote the rank of the concerned matrix and the dimension of given lattice, respectively.
Deﬁnition 2. Let b1 , b2 , . . ., bm ∈ Rn be linearly independent
tuples that generate a lattice Δ(b1 , b2 , . . .,
bm ) � Σi zi bi : zi ∈ Z},
its
dual
lattice
be
Δ∗ � z ∈ Z|∀ y ∈ Δ, 〈z, y〉 ∈ Z, where Δ can be represented as
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Bivariate Normal Distribution

arbitrary
lattice
point.
Note
that
DΔ,σ,c (z) � Dσ,c (z)/Dσ,c (Δ) � ρσ,c (z)/ρσ,c (Δ).
We now introduce an advanced lattice parameter (called
the smoothing parameter [35]) related to the Gaussian
measures on random lattices as follows.

0.3

Deﬁnition 3. Let Δ be a lattice of dimension n and ε > 0 be an
arbitrary small real number. The smoothing parameter is
deﬁned by ξ ε (Δ) to be the smallest σ > 0 such that
z≠0∈Δ∗ ρ1/σ,0 (z) ≤ ε holds.
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3.5. Hard Assumptions Based on Learning with Errors.
The “learning with errors” was introduced by Regev [36],
which is secure against quantum computing. In the following, we state the assumption with respect to the Gaussian
error distribution [35] and its parameterizations.

Figure 3: Gaussian distribution in multi dimensions.
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n
3.3. q-ary Lattice. The q-ary lattice satisfying Zm
q ⊆Δ⊆Zq , for
some integer q, is called q-ary lattice because q times vectors
of lattice also belongs to it. Given a matrix modulo q �
poly(n) (depends only dimension of lattice), denoted
A ∈ Zn×m
there are n-dimensional q-ary lattice
q ,
Δ⊥q � {z ∈ Zn : Az � 0(modq)} and a coset of the lattice as
Δuq � {z ∈ Zn : u � Az(modq)|z ∈ Zm }, where m, n and q are
integers and m > n. Here, A · z � 0 implies that:
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and A · z � u implies that:
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These q-ary lattices are applied in the construction of
cryptographic techniques. Now, if the matrix A is chosen
randomly, solving the short vector problem on Δ⊥ (A) is
equivalent to solve a hard problem in random lattice.
3.4. Gaussian Measures. Let
x, c ∈ Rn and σ > 0 be arbitrary.
2 2
Then, ρσ,c (x) � e− π‖(x− c)‖ /σ deﬁnes a Gaussian distribution
function (see Fig. 3) with center c and scaling σ, where the
total measure corresponding to ρσ,c is given by


x∈Rn

ρσ,c (x)dx � σ n . We can deﬁne the discrete Gaussian

distribution as DΔ,σ,c (z) � ρσ,c (z)/ρσ,c (Δ), where z ∈ Δ is an

Deﬁnition 4 (see [36]). Let n ∈ N, q � q(n) > 2, and s ∈ Znq
be a secret. Then, LWEs,ξ is a distribution of 〈b, bt s + z〉 over
Znq × Zq with b ∈ Znq is an arbitrary random and z ∈ Zq is
chosen from ξ, where ξ is the Gaussian distribution.
Deﬁnition 5 (see [37]). The “Learning with Errors” decision
problem is to distinguish betweenLWEs,ξ which is the distribution of〈b, bt s + z〉overZnq × Zq with randoms ∈ Znq and the
uniform random distribution overZnq × Zq , given access to the
random samples from the given distribution.
Regev [37] proved that the decision problem (learning
with errors) under a suitable prime modulus q and Gaussian
distribution ξ is as hard as solving the worst-case lattice
problem, known as “short independent vector problem” and
“decision short vector problem” in Euclidean norm, using
quantum algorithms. Suppose R/Z � [0, 1) is a group with
respect to modulo one operation. Let Φα be the Gaussian
distribution on R/Z with mean 0 and standard deviation
α/2π, under modulo one, where α > 0 is a real number.
Theorem 1 (see [37]). Let α � α(n) ∈ (0, 1)be a real
number, and q � q(n) > 0 be a prime such that αq > 2n holds.
If there exists a quantum algorithm that can solve LWEq,Φα ,
there also exists a quantum algorithm to solve “short independent vectors problem” and approximate “decision short
vector problem”, in Euclidean norm, under the worst-case
with in O(n/α) factors.
3.6. Regev’s Dual Cryptosystem. If Δ is a lattice, its dual is the
set Δ∗ consisting of tuples z ∈ L(Δ), that is, a linear span of Δ
such that inner product 〈z, y〉 is an integer for all y ∈ Δ.
Following the deﬁnition, one can easily observe that the dual
of Zn is Zn . The inner product between two n-tuples x and y
is deﬁned as 〈x, y〉 � xt y � ni�1 xi yi , where x � (x1 , x2 , . . .,
xn ) and y � (y1 , y2 , . . ., yn ) are tuples with the real entries.
The dual space Δ∗ has the same dimension as its primal
space Δ, and both are essentially isomorphic to each other.
Therefore, a dual space Δ∗ lies in the same space as the
primal Δ, and not necessarily be a sub-lattice of Δ. The lattice
Δ∗ contains non-integers even Δ contains only integers
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entries. The dual space is necessarily deﬁned as follows in
abstract vector space. If V⊆Rn is a vector space, a function Ψ:
V ⟶ R is called a linear function if it satisﬁes the following
conditions: 1) Ψ(ϑ1 + ϑ2 )� Ψ(ϑ1 )+Ψ(ϑ2 ), and 2)
Ψ(aϑ1 ) � aΨ(ϑ1 ), where a, b ∈ R and ϑ1 , ϑ2 ∈ V. The dual
space of an abstract vector space V is then the set of all linear
functions, where a function Ψ is represented as a tuple ϑ ∈ V
such that Ψ(x) � 〈ϑ, x〉, whereas the dual lattice is considered on the set of integers Z instead set of reals one R. The
dual of lattice Δ is the collection of linear functions of the
forms: Ψ: V ⟶ Z represented as tuples in span (Δ). Each
vector ϑ ∈ Δ∗ generates a linear function Ψϑ (x) � 〈ϑ, x〉
satisfying Ψϑ (Δ)⊆Z and partitions Δ into the layers as
Δ � ∪ i∈Z ϱ ∈ Z:
Ψϑ (ϱ) � i},
where
each
layer
Ψ−1
ϑ (i) � ϱ ∈ Δ: Ψϑ (ϱ) � i} is necessarily a shifted copy of
Δ ∩ ϑ⊥ � ϱ ∈ Δ: 〈ϑ, ϱ〉 � 0}, that is, a lower dimensional
sub-lattice orthogonal to ϑ with distance between layers
1/‖ϑ‖ implies that the sparser lattice has denser dual and
vice-versa. Therefore, the dual of cΔ is 1/cΔ, where c > 0 is an
arbitrary real.
Under the hard assumption “learning with errors”, one
can construct a public key cryptosystem under indistinguishable property of pseudo-random tuple 〈b, bt s + z〉
from a random sample. The pseudo-random bt s + z ∈ Zq is
used to mask a bit of the message in Regev’s cryptosystem
[37]. Furthermore, the dual Regev’s cryptosystem consists of
three phases: a) D-key-Gen, b) D-Encrypt, and c) D-Decrypt, which are discussed below.
1. D − key − Gen: Let A ∈ Zn×m
be a random matrix,
q
where m ≥ 2n log(q), fA : Zm ⟶ Zn : e↦Ae(mod
q). Choose an error e←DZm ,σ . It then computes its
syndrome as u � fA (e), where the secret vector
n
e ∈ Zm
q and the public key is u ∈ Zq .
2. D − Encrypt: Let b ∈ {0, 1} be a bit to be encrypted.
Choose a random s ∈ Znq with an error scalar x ∈ ξ
and an error vector y ∈ ξ m . It then outputs
c � 〈c0 , c1 〉, where c0 � ut s + x + b · q/2 and
c1 � At s + y.
3. D − De crypt: To perform the decryption on
c � 〈c0 , c1 〉 using the secret e under the matrix A, this
phase computes b � c0 − et c1 ∈ Zq and outputs 1 if b
is closer to q/2; else, it is 0.
3.7. Pre-image Samplable Family of Functions. Gentry et al.
[21] deﬁned a family of pre-image samplable functions that
plays a very important role in the construction of the
proposed encryption described in Section 4.
Deﬁnition 6. A family of pre-image samplable functions [21]
consists of three phases: a) Trap-Gen , b) Sample-Dom , and
c) Sample-Pre , which are given below.
• Trap-Gen(1κ ): Trap-Gen takes input as the parameterκ, and outputs a pair〈A, T〉, whereAis utilized in the
functionfA :Dκ ⟶ Rκ with
recognizable
domainDκ and rangeRκ , andTis a trapdoor for the
functionfA .

• Sample-Dom(A): Under function description A, it will
sample x ← ξ over the domain Dκ in such a way the
distribution of fA (x) is uniform over Rκ , and outputs x
accordingly.
• Sample-Pre(T, y): Under a trapdoor T and a value
y ∈ Rκ , it will sample an element x ∈ Dκ from the
distribution ξ under the criteria that fA (x) � y, and it
then outputs x.

3.7.1. Correctness. It is worth noticing that Sample-Dom
samples x←ξ over the domain Dκ such that fA (x) follows a
uniform distribution over the range Rκ , and Sample-Pre
samples x ∈ Dκ ←ξ as in Sample-Dom under condition
fA (x) � y.
3.7.2. Security. The security of the pre-image samplable
functions [21] is discussed below. The samplable functions
[21] must satisfy the following properties:
1. One-way without trapdoor: If A is a probabilistic
polynomial time adversary, the advantage
A(1κ , A, y)←f−1
A (y) ⊂ Dκ is negligible, where the
advantage is considered over all the possible choices of
A, the value y←Rκ is random, and A tosses the coin
randomly.
2. Pre-image minimum entropy: If y←Rκ , the conditioned minimum entropy of x←Sample − Dom(A) is
least under the condition fA (x) � y.
3. Collision-free without trapdoor: If A is a probabilistic polynomial time adversary, the advantage
A(1κ , A) results in the distinct x, x′ ←Dκ with
fA (x) � fA (x′ ) is negligible.
Theorem 2 (see [37]). If q � poly(n) is an arbitrary large
prime and m ≥ 5n log(q), there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm [38] that takes input as 1n , and
⊥
outputs a matrix A ∈ Zn×m
q and a full rank set S ⊂ Δ (A),
where the distribution corresponding to A is statistically close
to a uniform distribution over Zn×m
under the length
q
‖S‖ ≤ m2.5 .
Another algorithm is known as the sampling Gaussian,
denoted by Sample-Gauss, discussed by Gentry et al. [21],
plays a very important role in cryptographic construction.
The Sample-Gauss (B, σ, c) uses a random basis B in sampling from the Gaussian distribution centered at c with the
standard deviation σ over the lattice Δ(B).
Theorem 3 (see [37]). The probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm provided in [21] with inputs as a basisB,
a lattice
������
Δ(B), an appropriate parameterσ ≥ ‖B∗ ‖ · ω( log(m) )and
arbitraryc ∈ Rm , results in a sample distribution that is
statistically close to DΔ,σ,c .
The function deﬁned in [21] is a sample pre-image
consisting of three phases: a) Trap-Gen, b) Sample-Dom
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and c) Sample-Pre. Let κ be a security parameter, n � Θ(κ),
q � poly(n) be a large prime,
m ≥ 5n log(q), L � m2.5 and
������
Gaussian parameter σ ≥ Lω( log(m) ), respectively. Then,
• Trap-Gen(1κ , σ): Under the algorithm in Theorem 3,
choose a matrix A ∈ Zn×m
and a trapdoor
T ∈ Δ⊥ (A).
q
√��
m
Consider Dκ � e ∈ AZq : ‖e‖ ≤ σ m } and Rκ � Znq
and fA : Dκ ⟶ Rκ such that fA (e) � Ae(modq). This
phase then results 〈A, T〉.
• Sample-Dom(A, σ): Assuming B′ as a standard basis
for Zm , use Sample-Gauss(B′ , σ, 0) to get sample from
DZm ,σ .
• Sample-Pre(T, σ, y): Let k ∈ Zm be an arbitrary
number under condition Ak � y(modq). Then, use
Sample-Gauss(T, σ − k) [21] to sample v from
DΔ⊥ (A),σ,−k .

Theorem 4 (see [37]). Assume that the columns of A ∈ Zn×m
q
span Znq ,ε ∈ (0, 1/2), and σ ≥ ηε (Δ⊥ (A)). Then, the syndrome’s distribution u � Ae(modq) diﬀers by a statistically
distance equal to at most 2ε from the uniform distribution
over Znq .
To prove the correctness of the distribution ξ � DZm ,σ ,
for a given u←Znq and k←Zm is a solution to Ak � u(modq),
the conditional probability distribution of e←DZm ,σ under
Ae � u(modq) matches perfectly with k + DΔ⊥ (A),σ,−k . The
correctness of the distribution is as follows. It can be observed that fA (e) � Ae(modq) is indistinguishable from the
uniform distribution over Rκ � Znq , assuming the columns
of A ∈ Zn×m
spans Znq [21] with the probability 1 − q− n . Since
q ������
σ ≥ Lω( log(m) ), and ‖T‖ ≤ L, the result in [21] implies
σ ≥ ηε (Δ⊥ (A)). Thus, as a result, Sample-Pre(v + k) is
distributed under DZm ,σ
under the condition
A(v + k) � y(modq).
In the proof of security, we use the functions described in
[21], which are one-way and collision resistant functions. A
brief discussion of these two properties are given below.
• One-way without trapdoor: The process of inversion
of fA under a uniform random u←Rn is equivalent to
solving “in-homogeneous short integer solution”
problem, say ISISq,m,σ √�
m [21].
• Pre-image minimum entropy: Since all the pre-images follow the discrete Gaussian, it has minimum
entropy [21].
• Collision-free without trapdoor: Let z, z′ ←Dκ . Then,
a collision implies A(z − z′ ) � 0(modq), which actually solves the “short integer solution” problem, say
SISq,m,2σ √�
m.
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Our proposed identity-based encryption scheme consists
of four phases: a) Set-up, b) Extraction, c) Encrypts and d)
Decrypts. We take an identity ID as an arbitrary k-bits string
{0, 1}k , where k � Θ(κ) for a given security parameter κ. In
the following, we now discuss the details of these four
phases.
4.1. Set-up Phase. It includes the function Set-up(1κ ). First,
choose a suitable large prime q, a smoothing parameter σ
depending on the security parameter κ and an arbitrary
⊥
random matrix A ∈ Zn×m
q , under a short basis for Δ (A),
that is, TA with the help of Ajtai’s construction [38]. Let fA :
n
Zm
q ⟶ Zq be a function deﬁned as fA (e) � Ae(modq).
Next, pick a tuple u0 ∈ Znq and a random matrix Hi,b ∈ Zn×ℓ
q ,
 � 〈i, b, Hi,b 〉: 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, 0 ≤ b ≤ 1} is the
where ℓ � m and H
 , whereas
ordered set. The public parameters are A, u0 , H
TA is considered as the master secret.
4.2. Extraction Phase. This phase is accomplished by the
 ID, TA ). A decryption key is
function Extraction(A, u0 , H,
extracted related to the identity ID ∈ {0, 1}k under the master
secret TA as the trapdoor. The following steps need to be
executed:
• Let S � H(ID) and U be the set of non-zero positions
in the string S. After that, assemble an n × ℓ matrix
HID �
[Hi1 mod2,bi1 mod2|Hi2 mod2,bi2 mod2| · · · |Hiℓ mod2,biℓ
mod2] ∈ Zn×ℓ
q , where Hi1 mod2,bi1 mod2|Hi2 mod2,bi2 mod2|
 as Hi ,b1 or Hi ,b0 is according to
· · · |Hi mod2,bi mod2 ∈ H
ℓ

In this section, we propose a new provably secure identitybased encryption scheme. Note that such a scheme has a
compact public key and also achieves adaptive security in the
standard model [39].

1

1

4.3. Encrypts Phase. In this phase, we involve the function
 ID, b). In order to process the encryption
Encrypts(A, u0 , H,
on a bit b ∈ {0, 1} under the identity ID ∈ {0, 1}k using the
master key TA , the following steps are necessary:
• Let HID � [Hi1 mod2,bi1 mod2|Hi2 mod2,bi2 mod2| · · · |Hiℓ mod2,biℓ
mod2] ∈ Zn×ℓ
q , where Hi1 mod2,bi1 mod2|Hi2 mod2,bi2 mod2|
 because Hi mod2,b1 or Hi mod2,b0
· · · |Hi mod2,bi mod2 ∈ H
ℓ

4. Proposed Identity-Based Encryption (IBE)
Scheme in Standard Model

ℓ

either i1 (mod2) � 0 or i1 (mod2) � 1, respectively.
• Now, sample ri ←Zℓq under Sample − Dom
(Hi,bimod2 , σ), where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and consider r←Zℓq such
that rt � [rt1 |rt2 | · · · | − rtℓ ].
• Let u � u0 + HID r ∈ Znq . It can be observed as
′
u � u0 + ℓi�1 Himod2,bi(mod2) ri , where i is the non-zero
position in the string S.
• Next, apply the Sample-Pre(TA , σ, u) under the
trapdoor TA to ﬁnd the pre-image e of u satisfying
u � Ae(modq), and outputs the private key 〈e, r〉.

ℓ

1

1

is based on either i1 (mod2) � 0 or i1 (mod2) � 1.
• Choose an arbitrary s ∈ Znq .
• Pick x ∈ Zq , y � 〈y1 , y2 , . . ., ym 〉 ∈ Zm
q and z � 〈z1 ,
z2 , . . ., zℓ 〉 ∈ Zℓq which are sampled from the distributions ξ, ξ m , and ξ ℓ , respectively, based on the Regev’s
cryptosystem.
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Figure 4: Network model for IoT-enabled AI applications.

• Now, calculate c0 � ut0 s + x + bq/2 ∈ Zq , c1 � At s +
ℓ
t
y ∈ Zm
q and c2 � HID s + z ∈ Zq .
• Finally, the initiator sends the output as the cipher c �
〈c0 , c1 , c2 〉 to the responder.

4.4. Decrypts Phase. This phase is implemented by the

function Decrypts(A,u0 ,H,ID,k,c).
After receiving the cipher c � 〈c0 , c1 , c2 〉, with the private key 〈e, r〉 ∈ Zm+ℓ
q , the
responder executes the following steps:
• Compute v � c0 − et c1 + rt c2 ∈ Zq , and then compare
v with q/2 in Z.
• If |v − q/2| ≤ q/4, it results bit b � 1; else, it outputs the
bit b � 0.

5. Incorporating Proposed IBE Scheme for IoTEnabled AI Applications
In this section, we ﬁrst discuss the network model for IoTenabled AI applications, which is used for incorporating our
proposed IBE scheme described in Section 4. Next, we
describe the various phases where the proposed IBE scheme
has been applied for IoT.
5.1. Network Model. The network model considered for IoTenabled AI applications using our proposed IBE scheme is
presented in Figure 4. The model expresses various applications of IoT, such as traﬃc monitoring, smart home, and
IIoT. In this model, diﬀerent types of smart sensors, say
SSi |i � 1, 2, 3, . . . , nss  are connected with each other via the
nearby gateway node(s) GWNj |j � 1, 2, 3, . . . , ngwn , where
nss and ngwn denote the number of smart sensors and
gateway nodes to be deployed for each IoT application,
respectively. Note that there might be multiple nodes that

are connected with a particular application and the gateways
GWNj are further connected with the cloud server(s), say
CLSk |k � 1, 2, 3, . . . , ncls , where ncls is the number of cloud
servers. Before initiating any secure communications between GWNj and CLSk , they need to complete their registration process which is performed by a fully-trusted
registration authority (RA). Similarly, the RA also performs
the registration of each smart sensor node to be deployed in
various IoT applications. Next, a gateway node needs to
perform the secure data aggregation where the data is
collected through secure communication among the smart
sensors and the gateway node. In this case, we apply the
proposed IBE scheme for encryption/decryption of the data.
After that the gateway nodes send the data securely to the
cloud server(s) for secure data storage purpose. Finally, the
cloud servers CLSk can perform the Big data analytics using
AI/ML techniques with the data stored at CLSk .
5.2. Description of Various Phases. We have the following
phases:
• In the pre-deployment of IoT devices phase, the trusted
RA will perform the registration of each IoT smart
device prior to their deployment in respective application. After deployment of the IoT devices, they need
to communicate with their nearby gateway node(s).
For avoiding various attacks by an adversary, we use
the proposed IBE scheme for secure data transfer
among the sensor nodes and their gateway node(s).
• In the registration of gateway nodes and cloud servers
phase, the RA, RA also performs the registration of the
deployed gateway nodes and cloud servers. For secure
communication, we again use the proposed IBE
scheme for secure data transfer among the gateway
nodes and the cloud servers.
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Figure 5: High-level overview of various phases.

• The secure data aggregation at gateway phase allows a
gateway node to collect the data from its associated IoT
smart devices securely using the proposed IBE scheme.
• The secure data storage at cloud servers phase permits
storage of data at the cloud servers securely from the
gateway nodes with the help of the proposed IBE
scheme.
• Finally, the Big data analytics using AI phase is needed
because the cloud servers store a huge volume of data
from various IoT applications. Since the Big data
analytics provides numerous advantages, such as
better decision making and preventing fraudulent
activities, it is preferable to do the Big data analytics on
the data stored at the cloud servers.

A high-level description of various phases related to IoTenabled AI applications is given in Figure 5.

5.2.1. Pre-deployment of IoT Devices. Before deploying the
IoT smart devices (smart sensors) SSi in their respective
application, the trusted RA, RA executes the Set-up phase
described in Section 4.1 in order to select the system parameters. The steps are as follows:
 ,
• Step 1. The selected public parameters are A, u0 , H
whereas TA is as the master secret.
• Step 2. For each SSi , the RA, RA assigns a unique
identity IDSSi .
• Step 3. Next, for each SSi , the RA, RA executes the
Extraction phase described in Section 4.2 to extract a
decryption key related to IDSSi under the trapdoor
master secret TA . The private key for SSi is considered
as (eSSi , rSSi ).
5.2.2. Registration of Gateway Nodes and Cloud Servers.
The registration process for the deployed gateway nodes
GWNj and cloud servers CLSk is also based on the execution
of the Set-up phase, where the public parameters are

 , and TA is the trapdoor master secret. This phase
A, u0 , H
involves the following steps:
• Step 1. For each GWNj , the RA, RA assigns a unique
identity IDGWNj . In a similar way, for each CLSk , the
RA, RA also assigns a unique identity IDCLSk .
• Step 2. For each GWNj and CLSk , the RA, RA executes
the Extraction phase. After executing this process, the
private keys for GWNj and CLSk are selected as
(eGWNj , rGWNj ) and (eCLSk , rCLSk ), respectively.

5.2.3. Secure Data Aggregation at Gateway. In this phase, the
following steps are involved:
• Step 1. Suppose the IoT smart sensors SSi are deployed
in their respective IoT applications as shown in Figure 4. The gateway nodes GWNj and cloud servers
CLSk are also placed accordingly in the network. Let a
smart sensor SSi sense the information (data), say
DataSSi from its deployment area and want to communicate it securely with its gateway node GWNj ,
GWNj . For this purpose, the SSi , SSi generates a
current timestamp, say TSSSi , prepares a message of the
type MsgSSi � IDSSi , TSSSi , DataSSi  and encrypts
MsgSSi bit wise using the public parameters, identity of
GWNj , GWNj and trapdoor master key TA to create
the ciphertext CSSi � C0 , C1 , C2  as done in the Encrypts phase described in Section 4.3, where C0 , C1 and
C2 are the encrypted bit strings corresponding to the
bit strings of the MsgSSi . Next, SSi sends the encrypted
message {CSSi , TSSSi } to its destination GWNj , GWNj
via a public channel.

5.2.4. Secure Data Storage at Cloud Servers. In this phase, a
cloud server CLSk , CLSk receives the encrypted data from
the respective gateway nodes GWNj residing in an IoT
application, and stores the encrypted data in its database for
further processing. In order to do this, the following steps are
executed by the CLSk , CLSk :
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Figure 6: Overall mechanism of the proposed IBE scheme for IoT-based AI applications.

• Step 1. Once the message CGWNj , TSGWNj , is received at time TS∗GWNj , for checking replaying attacks,
CLSk , CLSk checks the validity of the received timestamp by the condition: |TSGWNj − TS∗GWNj | < ΔT. If
the condition fails, the process is immediately
terminated.
• If the timestamp validation is satisﬁed, the encrypted
data CGWNj is then stored in the database of CLSk ,
CLSk .

5.2.5. Big Data Analytics using AI. It is worth noticing that a
cloud server CLSk , CLSk receives the encrypted data generated by the IoT smart sensors residing in various applications via the aggregator nodes (gateway nodes). CLSk ,
CLSk can then decrypt the stored data bit wise using its own
private key (eCLSk , rCLSk ) and performs the Big Data analytics
steps using AI/ML techniques, such as “data acquisition and
ﬁltering”, “data extraction”, “data aggregation and representation”, “data analysis” as well as “data visualization”. The
results of this phase will provide some useful conclusions
and predictions on the stored data.
The overall mechanism of the proposed IBE scheme for
IoT-based AI applications is also illustrated in Figure 6. The
pre-deployment and registration phases are performed through
the steps 1, 2 and 3. Step 4 explains about the data aggregation
phase. While the steps 5 and 6 are about secure data storage,
Step 7 explains the Big data analytics using the AI techniques.
• Step 2. After receiving the message from SSi , GWNj ,
GWNj ﬁrst checks the validity of the received timestamp by the condition: |TSSSi − TS∗SSi | < ΔT, where
TS∗SSi and ΔT represent the time when the message was
received and the maximum transmission delay, respectively. If the condition is satisﬁed, GWNj , GWNj
proceeds to decrypt CSSi bit wise using its private
(secret) key (eGWNj , rGWNj ) with the help of the Decrypts phase described in Section 4.4 to obtain
IDSSi , TSSS′i , DataSSi . After that if the checking condition: TSSS′i � TSSSi is valid, GWNj , GWNj considers
the data is fresh. Thus, no replay attack has been there

during this process with the timestamping mechanism.
Of course, for this purpose, it is reasonable to assume
that the network entities are synchronized with their
clocks [8].
• Step 3. Now, GWNj , GWNj generates a current
timestamp TSGWNj , encrypts the prepared message
MsgGWNj � MsgSSi , IDGWNj , TSGWNj �(IDSSi , TSSSi ,
DataSSi ) , ID GWNj, TSGWNj } bit wise using the public
key of its corresponding cloud server CLSk to obtain
the ciphertext CGWNj � C0′, C1′, C2′ as done in the
Encrypts phase, and sends the encrypted message
{CGWNj , TSGWNj } to its respective CLSk , CLSk via a
public channel, where C0′, C1′ and C2′ are the encrypted
bit strings corresponding to the bit strings of the
MsgGWNj .

6. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed encryption scheme by using a sequence of games played between
an adversary, say A and a challenger, say B, namely the
games Gl , for l � 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. The initial game G0 is considered
as the real attack, whereas the ﬁnal game G4 is the game that
cannot be cracked by the adversary A. Each transition from a
game Gi to another game Gi+1 is indistinguishable with a
negligible advantage under some hard assumption. If there
are polynomial time games, each of the transitions is also
indistinguishable with the negligible advantage meaning that
the advantage of A in real attack is negligible. We now deﬁne
the games in order to ensure the indistinguishable transitions.
6.1. Games Descriptions. The following games are discussed
below.
• Game(G0 ): This game is played between the adversary A and the challenger B with both honest and
indistinguishable properties under the IND-sIDCPA property. We have deﬁned as earlier that, under
“selective identity chosen plaintext attack
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IND-sID-CPA” property, A needs to submit target
identity at advance to the B, before B runs the Set-up
algorithm.
• Game(G1 ): This game is same as G0 except in the Setup phase, B computes the matrices Hi,b , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
and b ∈ {0, 1} not directly, but as an arbitrary public
key of random GPV trapdoors [21] corresponding to
the trapdoor Ti,b .
• Game(G2 ): This game is same as G1 , except B neither
uses the master secret TA nor the Extraction phase to
answer the queries to private keys, but it uses another
Trapdoor-Extraction phase and trapdoors Ti,b for
1 ≤ i ≤ k and b ∈ {0, 1}. The trapdoors are represented
 � {〈i, b, Ti,b 〉: 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 0 ≤ b ≤ 1}.
as T

 ID, i∗ , Ti∗ ,b∗ 〉: A key that
Trapdoor-Extraction〈A, u0 , H,
corresponds to decryption is extracted for the identity ID,
with the help of the trapdoor:
1. Let bi �biti(mod2) (ID) be the position of non zero bit
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and b ∈ {0, 1}. Assemble an n × ℓ matrix
HID � [Hi1 ,bi1 mod2|Hi2 ,bi2 mod2| · · ·, |Hiℓ ,biℓ mod2] ∈ Zn×ℓ
q ,
 bewhere Hi1 ,bi1 mod2|Hi2 ,bi2 mod2| · · ·, |Hiℓ ,biℓ mod2 ∈ H
cause Hi1 ,b1 or Hi1 ,b0 is according to either i1 (mod2) �
0 or i1 (mod2) � 1.
2. Sample ri ←Zℓq under Sample-Dom(Hi,bimod2 , σ),
where i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., (k} − {i∗ }, that is, from the set Zℓq .
 � u0 + HID r ∈ Znq . It can be then observed as
3. Let u
′
 � u0 + ℓi ∈ {1,2,...,k}−{i∗ } Hi,bi(mod2) ri , where i is the non
u
zero position in the string S � H(ID), and r is the
concatenation of all ri s, except 0, which follows the
distribution ri∗ .
4. Using the distribution DZm ,σ , sample e←Zm
q under the
Sample-Dom(A, σ) algorithm.
→
 , and then use
5. Compute u � Ae ∈ Znq and u � u − u
the Sample-Pre(Ti∗ ,b∗ ,σ,
u) to sample ri∗ ←Zℓq such
 � Hi∗ ,b∗ ri∗ .
that u
6. Let rt �[rt1 |rt2 | · · · |rtℓ ] including ri∗ such that
u � u0 + HID r. Output a private key K � 〈e, r〉.
• Game(G3 ): This game is same as G2 , except B
 It knows only the
 with the trapdoors T.
computes H
trapdoor of ith index, but not corresponding to ith ,
ith -bit of the target ID∗ .
1. Let biti(mod2) (ID∗ ) for i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., (k}, be the modulo
of non-zero ith , ith position declared by A to B in the
Set-up phase.
 by taking b ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., (k}
2. B generates H
such that b ≠ biti(mod2) (ID∗ ), and executes GPV
trapdoors [21] as in the G2 to obtain Hi,b corresponding to Ti,b . Furthermore, it takes b ∈ {0, 1},
b ∈ {0, 1} such that b � biti(mod2) (ID∗ ) for a random
i ∈ {1, i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., (k}, (k}, and takes Hi,b ∈ Zn×ℓ
q with
Ti,b � ⊥.
3. To extract the private key for ID ≠ ID∗ , B repeats the
game G2 , except i∗ is picked such that
biti(mod2) (ID) ≠ biti(mod2) (ID∗ ) and i∗ corresponding
to a legal query. If b∗ � biti∗ (mod2) (ID) and Ti∗ ,b∗ ≠ ⊥,

11
 ID, i∗ ,
B executes Trapdoor-Extraction〈A, u0 , H,
Ti∗ ,b∗ 〉 to generate the private key.
The
→ challenge cipher then is generated by Encrypts (A,
H0 , H , ID∗ , b∗ ) for an arbitrary b∗ ∈ {0, 1}, and outputs
c � 〈c0 , c1 , c2 〉 as the challenge.
• Game(G4 ): This game is also same as G3 , except B
gives a challenge to A that is not computed honestly,
but it is a random cipher, that is, c � 〈c0 , c1 , c2 〉 is
chosen randomly from Z1+m+ℓ
distribution.
q

6.2. Games Transitions. In the following, we now show that
each of the transitions between the successive games
(Game(G0 ),
Game(G1 ),
Game(G2 ),
Game(G3 ),
Game(G4 )) is indistinguishable as follows.
• Transition: Game(G0 ), (G0 ) ⟶ Game(G1 ), (G1 ):
Both games are identical with respect to A, and B
possesses the information regarding trapdoor Ti,b
corresponding to Hi,b which is not known to A.
• Transition: Game(G1 ), (G1 ) ⟶ Game(G2 ), (G2 ):
Both games are identical with respect to A, and B
possesses a diﬀerent algorithm for key extraction and it
is invisible to A.
• Transition: Game(G2 ), (G2 ) ⟶ Game(G3 ), (G3 ):
Both games are identical with respect to A, and B
knows only half of all the hash-trapdoors and answers
if the extraction queries are known, and these are
invisible to A.
• Transition: Game(G3 ), (G3 ) ⟶ Game(G4 ), (G4 ):
The views are not identical with respect to A, but are
indistinguishable under “learning with errors”
assumption.

1. In the beginning, B receives 1 + m + ℓ samples of
“learning with errors” assumption 〈aj , bj 〉 ∈ Zn+1
q ,
for 1 ≤ j ≤ 1 + m + ℓ, with random aj ∈ Znq , and
either bj for 1 ≤ j ≤ 1 + m + ℓ are random or bj �
atj s + xj for 1 ≤ j ≤ 1 + m + ℓ with a random s ∈ Znq
and Gaussian xj ←ξ.
2. In the beginning, B also receives ID∗ from A to be
challenged. →
By applying the Set-up phase, B
computes H . B picks b ∈ {0, 1} such that
b ≠ biti(mod2) (ID∗ ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and executes GPV
trapdoors [21] as in G2 to obtain random Hi,b and
its trapdoor Ti,b as in another G3 and G4 , respectively. Now, B picks b ∈ {0, 1} such that
b � biti(mod2) (ID∗ ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, random Hi,b and its
jth -column “learning with errors” instance aj , and
then sets Ti,b � ⊥.
3. B answers the private key queries as in the games
G3 and G4 using the corresponding trapdoors. B
picks random b ∈ {0, 1} and computes a challenge
cipher c∗0 � b1 + bq/2, c∗1 � 〈b1+i : 1 ≤ i ≤ m〉 ∈ Zm
q,
c∗2 � 〈b1+m+i : 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ〉 ∈ Zℓq .
4. Finally, A guesses a bit b∗ ∈ {0, 1}, and B returns
the correct b∗ � b; else, returns a random bit as an
answer to the “learning with errors” instances.
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Table 1: A comparative study on recommended bit-size: Lattice
versus classical discrete logarithm.
Protocol
DLP storage
Lattice storage
DLP
communication
Lattice
communication

Primitive
A∈

g ∈ Z∗p
 u0 ∈ Znq
H,

Zm×n
q ,
r

g , Pg

rx

∈

Z∗p

ut0 s + x + bq/2 ∈ Zq ,

Recommended bitsize
k′ � log p
16κ2 log3 κ

Table 2: Key length and key generation time comparative study:
RSA versus Lattice based cryptosystem.
Approach

Key-length
(in bits)
512
1024
2048
1169
1841
4024

RSA

k′ � log p
8κ log2 κ

Lattice-based

A s + y ∈ Zm
q,
HtID s + z ∈ Zℓq
t

It is thus worth noticing that B is indistinguishable in
both the games G3 and G4 with respect to view of A, excluding the challenge cipher. The “learning with errors”
instance is random for the challenge cipher and components
of c∗ has same distribution as in the game G3 , and so they
will be the components in G4 .
6.3. Anonymous Cipher and Indistinguishablity. In this
section, we discuss the notion of semantic security that is
discussed in Section 3. It is observed that the proposed
identity-based encryption scheme provides indistinguishable property of the ciphers from random strings of equal
lengths, although an adversary can presume the identity of
the receiver. The challenge cipher is then pseudo-random
under the “learning with errors” assumption, which implies
indistinguishability.

7. Performance Comparison
This section provides computation costs and recommended
bit-size of the proposed identity-based encryption scheme
and compares them with the other relevant approaches, such
as discrete logarithm-based schemes, RSA public key
cryptosystem [31] and ElGamal cryptosystem [32].
7.1. Comparison on Recommended Bit-size. Let κ be an appropriate security parameter and O(κ2 ) be the size of public
key. We can then relate the computation time in terms of
security parameter complexity O(κ2 ), O(κ2 ). It can be
compared with the size of classic public key cryptosystems
(RSA and ElGamal) which is O(κ) and computation time in
terms of security parameter as O(κ3 ) [33, 36].
We
take
q �O(κ2 ),
m � O(κ log(q))
and
n �O(κ log(q)) as the parameters, where κ is the security
parameter. Furthermore, we consider q �κ2 , m �κ log(q)
and n �κ log(q) as the parameters to simplify the computation. The storage cost is mn log(q) �16κ2 log3 (q) and the
communication cost is 8κ log2 (κ) in the proposed scheme.
The cipher is computed as c0 �ut0 s + x + bq/2∈∈Zq ,
ℓ
t
c1 �At s + y ∈ Zm
q and c3 � HID s + z ∈ Zq , that is, in the
form of triplet c � 〈c0 , c1 , c2 〉. The size of public keys inn

volves the security parameters A ∈ Zm×n
q , H, u0 ∈ Zq , which
3
2
2
2
is roughly 16κ log (κ), that is, O(m log(q)) � O(κ log(κ)).
In Table 1, a comparative study on recommended bit-size

Key generation time
(in milliseconds)
360
1280
4195
4
7.5
17.5

Table 3: Encryption and decryption costs comparative study: RSA
versus Lattice based cryptosystem.
Approach

RSA

Lattice-based

Key-length
(in bits)

512
1024
2048
1169
1841
4024

Message
encryption
(blocks per
second)
2440
930
310
5940
3680
1470

Message decryption
(blocks per second)
120
20
3
2820
1620
610

with respect to Lattice and classical discrete logarithm due to
the “discrete logarithm problem (DLP)” intractability.
7.2. Comparison on Computation Costs. In Table 2, the relationship between the length of keys in bits and the key
generation time in milliseconds has been shown. Based on
the results reported in [40], in RSA-based public cryptosystem, the key lengths of 512, 1024 and 2048 bits take 360,
1280 and 4195 milliseconds, respectively. On the other hand,
in the proposed lattice-based scheme, the key lengths of
1170, 1841 and 4024 bits require the generation time having
4, 7.5 and 17.5 milliseconds, respectively [40]. This clearly
shows that the lattice-based IBE scheme requires less
computational time for key generation part as compared to
other public key cryptosystems, such as RSA.
Table 3 shows a comparative analysis on the key length in
bits with the encryption and decryption speed in terms of
blocks per second based on the results reported in [40]. It is
noticed that when the key size is smaller, the encryption and
decryption processing time for the blocks per second are less.
However, the lattice-based cryptosystem performs better
than RSA-based public key cryptosystem even if the key size
is large.
7.3. Comparison on Security. A comparative study on the key
length size and the security aspect between the RSA-based
public key cryptosystem and lattice-based cryptosystem has
been presented in Table 4 based on the results reported in
[40]. Million instructions per second (MIPS) is taken as an
“approximate measure of a computer’s raw processing
power”, which is considered in the comparative study. It is
observed that in both the cases when the key size is large, the
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Table 4: Key length and security comparative study: RSA versus
Lattice based cryptosystem.
Approach

RSA
Lattice-based

Key-length
(in bits)
512
1024
2048
1169
1841
4024

Security
(MIPS per year)
4 × 105
3 × 1012
3 × 1021
2 × 106
4.6 × 1014
3.4 × 1035

[3]

[4]

[5]
[6]

security of the system increases. Moreover, even for a smaller
key size the lattice based cryptosystem provides signiﬁcantly
better security as compared to that for an RSA-based
cryptosystem.
In summary, the lattice-based cryptosystem has several
advantages, such as: (a) “cryptographic resistance compared
to RSA”, (b) “faster key generation”, and (c) “faster encryption and decryption of the messages”. In addition, the
prime advantage of the lattice-based cryptosystem is its
resistance to quantum computer attacks.

8. Concluding Remarks
In this work, we attempted to design an advanced identitybased encryption that is a very important cryptographic tool
to ensure conﬁdentiality in the current quantum era. The
proposed encryption is a provably post-quantum secure
without random oracles. Since lattices depends on algebraic
operations that are typically matrix addition and multiplication, they make the encryption much eﬃcient as compared
to other public key cryptosystems, such as RSA. In addition,
the proposed scheme is also anonymous and it produces the
pseudo-random ciphers. Finally, we incorporated the constructed identity based encryption (IBE) scheme for IoT
applications and described how the Big data analytics using
the AI/ML techniques will be helpful in such applications.
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